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 1. Robert Venturi, Structure
 of Benjamin Franklin's House,
 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
 1973-76
 Maurice Lagueux is a professor in the De-
 partment of Philosophy at the Universite
 de Montreal. He has published various
 papers in the philosophy of history, phi-
 losophy of economics, and philosophy of
 architecture.
 Assemblage 35: 18-35 ? 1998 by the




 Few philosophers have written books or even papers dis-
 cussing architecture, and among them still fewer have been
 philosophers of the analytic tradition that has dominated
 twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon philosophy. Thus it is inter-
 esting to note that Nelson Goodman, one of the most im-
 portant analytic philosophers, has devoted to the question of
 architecture one brief article entitled "How Buildings
 Mean" as well as, earlier, a few pages in his Languages of
 Art, the work in which he developed his theory of art in
 general.' Although Goodman's views on art as illustrated
 through painting, dance, and music have been extensively
 discussed, his views on architecture have been, for the most
 part, ignored. The difference in attention given to these
 various applications of his ideas is partially explained by the
 fact that Goodman is clearly much less sensitive to architec-
 ture than to other arts and that the architectural examples
 he chooses to illustrate his ideas are not very convincing.
 When examined in the context of his theses on art in gen-
 eral, however, his thinking about architecture is well worth
 revisiting. Despite the sketchiness of his discussion of the
 discipline, his original suggestions can be fruitfully reas-
 sessed by those interested in their application to architec-
 tural theory. Even when the limitations of these ideas are
 revealed - and these limitations will be underlined here
 - the conceptual apparatus on which they are based will
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 prove to be helpful, at least in characterizing some particular
 aspects of architecture and its relation to other arts.
 To assess Goodman's views on architecture, it is important
 to recall the structure of Languages of Art; in particular, it is
 useful to remember that its main theses are presented as the
 respective answers to two questions that, as he himself ad-
 mits, are relatively banal and only loosely linked together.
 The first question, which concerns representation in art,
 can be formulated in the following manner: In what sense
 does art represent nature, and if - as Goodman holds - it
 is not by imitation, how can we speak of a connection be-
 tween art and the world to which it refers? This question
 leads him to define the proper place of representation
 among the various other symbolization modes actualized by
 painting and other arts. The second question, which con-
 cerns the authenticity of works of art, might be phrased as
 follows: Does it make sense for an art lover who would ac-
 knowledge his inability to distinguish between an original
 painting and its hypothetically perfect copy, but who knows
 that one of them is a forgery, to claim on a strictly aesthetic
 level that the forgery is less valuable than the original? This
 question leads him to seek differential criteria of authentic-
 ity for works of art depending on whether they belong to
 painting, music, or, eventually, architecture, and hence to
 discuss problems concerning their very identity. Goodman
 devotes the first two chapters of Languages of Art to the first
 question and a large part of the following three chapters to
 the second. In the sixth and final chapter, he shows that the
 ideas he has set forth in response to these questions clarify
 one another by constituting - and this is apparently the
 goal of the whole book - a basis for a theory of symbolic
 systems applicable to the analysis of aesthetic experience. I
 propose to examine Goodman's answers to each of these
 questions insofar as they bear on architecture, starting with
 the second, which, in contrast to the first, can be discussed
 before an analysis of his theory of symbolization as such.
 The Identity and Authenticity of Works
 of Architecture
 To the proposition that two physically indistinguishable
 paintings (an authentic one and a forgery that would be a
 perfect copy of it) cannot, on a strictly aesthetic level, be
 considered of equal value, Goodman responds that such a
 claim is legitimate. He bases his assertion on an interesting
 discussion whose conclusions alone will be reported here.
 For Goodman, the very notion of a painting's authenticity
 involved in this question presumes that the painting's own
 identity cannot be determined without reference to the his-
 torical conditions of its production. It is, indeed, to the his-
 torical conditions of the original painting's production that
 we refer when we maintain that the very fact that it was ex-
 ecuted by the hand of a great master of the past excludes
 the possibility of considering as the same work a copy ex-
 ecuted by a forger, as perfect as it might be. Were we to
 abstain from taking into consideration such historical con-
 ditions, we would be forced to conclude that the two paint-
 ings, exactly similar in all other regards, are two versions of
 the same work of art and that the problem of the authen-
 ticity of the so-called copy does not arise. For this reason,
 Goodman proposes the term autographic for those works
 of art, such as paintings, whose "most exact duplication of
 it does not thereby count as genuine," as opposed to
 allographic works of art, such as musical compositions,
 whose quite various renditions can be considered equally
 "authentic."2 Naturally, that new renditions of musical
 works are not forgeries does not imply that these works fail
 to have their own identity. Thus Goodman claims that the
 identity of such allographic works is determined by their
 "compliance" with the requirements of a score that is writ-
 ten in a "notational" language.
 After devoting a chapter of Languages of Art to the analysis
 of the properties of notational language and another to the
 20
This content downloaded from 132.204.182.56 on Tue, 16 Oct 2018 13:59:56 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Lagueux
 examination of various arts to establish the extent to which
 they are autographic or allographic, Goodman concludes
 this review of the arts with three pages on the special case
 of architecture. At first glance, this art seems to be closer to
 painting than to music and we would consider it auto-
 graphic in that a building is the materialization and the fi-
 nal step of a long (historical) process that started with the
 architect's initial sketches and that was oriented toward the
 erection of a singular building on a particular site. But,
 Goodman argues, considering that in a housing scheme,
 houses like, say, "Smith-Jones Split-Level #17" comply with
 an architect's plans, we must admit "that architecture has a
 reasonably appropriate notational system and that some of
 its works are unmistakably allographic."' Thus architecture
 is, in some sense, an allographic art like music. Goodman
 clearly betrays some hesitations on this ground, however;
 and, after observing that a copy of the Taj Mahal could
 hardly be characterized as an "instance of the same work,"
 he acknowledges that "architecture is a mixed and transi-
 tional case." Without underestimating the importance of
 these nuances in Goodman's mind, it seems fair to say that
 his most original contention on this subject is that the
 architect's plans can define a work of architecture as a
 specific work, insofar as this work must comply with their
 requirements, much as the rendition of a musical work has
 to comply with those of a musical score.4
 Let us expand a little further the discussion of the some-
 what paradoxical aspect of the alleged allographic character
 of architectural works.5 Although it is entirely in accor-
 dance with current usage to consider different renditions of
 the same symphony (as long as the score is more or less fol-
 lowed) as instances of the same work just as much as the
 rendition directed by the composer himself, it is far more
 difficult to allow that a faithful copy of a work of architec-
 ture constitutes an instance of the work in question to the
 same degree as the work we feel obliged to term the "origi-
 nal." Certainly, a work of architecture shares with a work
 of music the property of not being, as a general rule, im-
 mediately executed by its creator. In this way, a work of ar-
 chitecture may be posthumous in a sense that can hardly
 be applied to pictorial work. The Grande Arche de la
 Defense, for example, is not considered an "unfinished"
 work, even though Johan Otto von Spreckelsen, its archi-
 tect, died (having completed the essential plans) during
 the first stages of its construction. It is even true that the
 construction of a work can be postponed for a very long
 time, although not without causing certain theoretical
 problems that arise when classifying it among the works
 that together make up the architect's corpus. For example,
 it was by the end of the 1980s that the Essen Opera House,
 which Alvar Aalto (who died in 1976) had designed for the
 same site in the early 1960s, was constructed. This project
 had been canceled for financial reasons, but was revital-
 ized and realized with the help of Aalto's firm more than a
 decade after its author's death. Now we can quite easily
 grant that we are dealing here with an authentic work by
 Aalto; but if such is the case, why could not any project or
 even any building come back to life after having been
 declared genuinely "dead"? In this manner, the famous
 Barcelona Pavilion built by Mies van der Rohe for the In-
 ternational Exposition of 1929, held in the city that gave it
 its name, was disassembled shortly afterwards - under
 conditions such that the materials from which it was con-
 structed disappeared mysteriously - but was recently re-
 built on the site in accordance with its architect's plans
 using similar materials. Here we can state that the 1929
 and 1989 pavilions, which are undoubtedly much more
 alike than are some interpretations of the same symphony,
 constitute two instances of the same work and can be iden-
 tified allographically, even if, when faced with purists up-
 set at not being able to admire Mies's own work, we might
 hesitate to assure them that these are equivalent instances
 of the same building.
 21
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 3. Le Corbusier, L'Esprit
 Nouveau pavilion reconstructed
 in Bologna, Italy, by Jose
 Oubrerie and Giuliano Gresleri,
 1977
 In other instances of reconstruction, the materials remain
 identical but the site changes: for example, the USSR Pa-
 vilion at Montreal Expo 67, reerected in Moscow, or the
 medieval church transplanted from the Rh-ne Valley to
 Milwaukee, Wisconsin.6 Is it reasonable to say that we have
 visited a medieval church in the American Great Lakes
 area? In still other cases, both the materials and the site are
 different, as with the Esprit Nouveau Pavilion built for the
 Paris Exposition of 1925 by Le Corbusier and rebuilt fifty-
 two years later in Bologna with the help of one of the
 architect's assistants and in accordance with the original
 plans. Is there a difference between the attitude, well de-
 scribed by Goodman, of a person who would refuse to ac-
 cept that a perfect copy of a Rembrandt is worth as much
 aesthetically as the original painting by the master and the
 attitude of one who would not be satisfied with admiring
 his favorite architect's work in Bologna? How would we re-
 act to a fund-raising campaign to save the Bologna recon-
 struction, which is presently deteriorating, when we know
 that many other works built directly by Le Corbusier des-
 perately need repair as well? Would it not be odd to hold
 that such reconstructions complying with the original plans
 are authentic works of an architect, when we tend to down-
 grade as inauthentic the often admirable reconstruction of
 the many works of medieval and classical architecture "irre-
 mediably" destroyed by war?
 Thus, despite the notational nature of architectural plans,
 that a piece of architecture might be seen as allographic is
 more difficult to maintain than Goodman seems to suggest.7
 Of course, this may very well be because in architecture the
 site is an integral part of the work (a fact almost totally ig-
 nored by Goodman). Some works, such as Frank Lloyd
 Wright's Fallingwater House, illustrate this with dclat: could
 we seriously maintain that a reconstruction of this work any-
 where but over its stream constitutes an equivalent instance
 of it? But it is by no means necessary to resort to such spec-
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 tacular examples. Contemporary architecture is increasingly
 sensitive to its dependence on context in a way that does not
 apply to painting and music; yet we can detect it as well in
 much older architecture: the Church of San Carlo alle
 Quattro Fontane is one of Borromini's masterpieces because
 it takes brilliant advantage of a particularly bleak site. Were
 it faithfully duplicated elsewhere, it would become a rather
 awkward and uselessly distorted building. Or, in a different
 light, think of the sports arena built by Davis and Brody at
 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, whose shape
 echoes in one of its angle the acclaimed shape of the stair
 along Aalto's Baker House Dormitory, which fronts it. To
 maintain its (allographic) identity, would a reconstruction of
 this building elsewhere require a reconstruction of Aalto's
 building as well? This issue becomes more complicated
 when a modern work is an annex to an existing building or
 when it is developed from an older building that has been
 preserved.8 In other and still more difficult cases, the context
 to which a building is dependent might be largely symbolic:
 consider Egon Eiermann's Gedichtniskirche, whose mod-
 ern structure adjoined to the ruins of the original Memorial
 Church on the Kurfiirstendamm has become one of Berlin's
 most striking architectural symbols. If we were to suppose
 that a wealthy admirer of this work had erected an exact
 copy of it somewhere in the New World, even allowing that
 the architect would have agreed to direct the construction of
 this "exact" copy, how could we speak of another instance of
 the same work when the copy has been stripped of all the
 potential meaning attached to the church in Berlin? As a
 limiting case, we might imagine the problem of copying the
 hollow structure that Robert Venturi erected on the site of
 Benjamin Franklin's house in Philadelphia, since this piece
 of architecture is nothing but a framed site, or better, noth-
 ing but its own symbolic context.
 Now, some works of music were conceived to be presented







 ~r; I~ir  1
 ~?




 4. Davis and Brody, MIT Hockey
 Rink and Field House,
 Cambridge, Massachusetts,
 1980-81, view of corner
 reflecting, in the background,
 Aalto's Baker House
 Dormitory, 1947-49
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 in a different context might be stripped of the symbolic po-
 tential that the works would have had on these occasions;
 nonetheless, these interpretations are authentic renditions
 of the same work. But the same cannot be said of architec-
 tural works. We would not say that we have experienced the
 feeling associated with Eiermann's church after having vis-
 ited its hypothetical American reconstruction, while we
 would acknowledge without hesitation on leaving a con-
 cert that we had heard, for example, an interpretation of
 Handel's Water Music, though we did not take part in the
 festivities that this work was designed to embellish. A musi-
 cal work might take into account the context present at the
 time of its creation, but, with the exception of the unrealis-
 tic hypothesis according to which a work would have been
 created only to be destroyed and forgotten after its first ren-
 dition, music is not created to exist in a single, particular
 context. Furthermore, this context is actually outside it, in
 that the splashes of water jets and the explosion of fireworks
 would not be considered by its composer an integral part of
 a musical work like Water Music. With a work of architec-
 ture, on the other hand, the architect would normally con-
 ceive as an integral part of his design, say, the surrounding
 gardens. Even adjacent woodlands or buildings become
 part of the work of the architect who makes a point of plac-
 ing existing trees or neighboring buildings somewhere in
 his site plans in continuity with what he is designing. True,
 such a context can be (progressively or abruptly) modified,
 but the works in question might then be distorted and even
 destroyed in the eyes of many purists. Is it still possible to
 admire the architectural charm of villas suffocated by con-
 crete buildings erected where their gardens formerly ex-
 tended? Certainly, some architectural works have been
 designed to be produced serially and not for a specific
 context, not only the reproducible Split-Level referred to
 by Goodman, but also more respected works like Le
 Corbusier's Domino House or Buckminster Fuller's
 Dymaxion House. But these architectural achievements,
 which might be seen as interesting ideas rather than genu-
 ine works of art, are clearly atypical of architecture.
 Hence, works of architecture can hardly be characterized as
 allographic, since, if we disregard a few atypical exceptions,
 the strictest fidelity to its plans will not be enough to turn a
 "reconstruction" of a building into another instance of it. Yet
 neither are they autographic, since their identity is not really
 defined by the historical conditions of their production, un-
 less we consider that the site is in some way included in what
 Goodman means by the "historical conditions" of the pro-
 duction of a work of art. But if such is the proper interpreta-
 tion of Goodman's views, it would cease to be obvious that
 paintings could qualify as autographic; for unless they are
 structurally linked with architecture (like frescoes or altar-
 pieces), they are typically context independent and can be
 exhibited anywhere in the world without loss of authenticity.
 If it turns out that the immediate involvement of the archi-
 tect in the process of production is less important than the
 context of its building when it comes to rejecting the strictly
 allographic character of a "mixed and transitional case" like
 architecture, the bipolar character of Goodman's distinction
 might well be questioned. Be that as it may, the point here is
 not so much to challenge Goodman's distinction between
 autographic and allographic arts, but rather, to show how
 such a discussion can be used to better grasp what makes an
 art like architecture quite different from other arts. Indeed,
 despite this interrogation, the distinction as such will not be
 a less helpful tool for characterizing what makes the authen-
 ticity and the identity of a building in contrast with that of a
 painting or a musical work.
 Goodman's Theory of Symbolization
 It is unsurprising that Goodman, who has been interested
 for quite some time in linguistic systems, has attempted to
 24
This content downloaded from 132.204.182.56 on Tue, 16 Oct 2018 13:59:56 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Lagueux
 bring out the systematic dimensions of symbolism when
 analyzing aesthetic experience. Indeed, he developed a
 general theory of symbolization (which, in his mind, is
 nothing else than a general theory of reference) in seeking
 to address aesthetic questions with the aid of theoretical in-
 struments similar to those he had used previously when ex-
 amining various questions in the philosophy of science and
 the philosophy of language.9 Yet to conclude from all this
 that Goodman's philosophy of art is simply the application
 of his philosophy of language to art would be unjust and de-
 ceptive. For although he holds that a painting that is a work
 of art is clearly based on a "depiction system," he refuses to
 consider this system a language."' In his view, there can be
 no question here of analyzing painting as a language, but
 rather of analyzing it in a similar way to language, without
 presupposing that language takes priority in this matter. In
 brief, painting and language are both systems of symboliza-
 tion. It is in this context that Goodman claims to clarify, by
 unearthing the rules of such systems, the question of the
 representation of nature by art.
 Representation, for Goodman, is simply one means of sym-
 bolization, and this is true even at a second degree: On the
 one hand, representation is but one mode of denotation
 among others, like verbal description, musical notation,
 and quotation. On the other hand, denotation itself is but
 one mode of symbolization (or reference) among others,
 like exemplification, expression, and chains of complex
 symbolization derived from them. Goodman holds that de-
 notation occurs when a symbol of any kind is applied to an
 object or an event; for example, when, to characterize an
 animal, we use the word dog or draw a picture of a dog. By
 contrast, exemplification corresponds to the inversion (from
 the point of view of the referential direction) of an act of de-
 notation: that which is denoted can refer to that which de-
 notes it by exemplifying it. For example, a dog called Rex
 exemplifies the property that the word dog and our drawing
 aim to convey. Yet it is important to see that this distinction
 between these two referential directions is based on a fun-
 damental asymmetry. Logically, denotation precedes exem-
 plification and constitutes a necessary condition of it. But it
 is not the case that everything denoted exemplifies that
 which denotes it." Within the linguistic context in which
 the notion of denotation was invented, the basic idea is as
 follows: A predicate denotes a property belonging to various
 objects; because of this, any one of these objects can in
 principle exemplify the predicate that denotes one of its
 properties or, said more briefly, can exemplify this property.
 Yet Goodman warns us that to exemplify, it is not sufficient
 for an object to have one of its properties denoted. Rather,
 this object must also refer explicitly to the predicate that de-
 notes this property. And given that, for Goodman, reference
 and symbolization are equivalent notions, such an explicit
 reference - such an exemplification - can be considered
 as a mode of symbolization totally distinct from denotation.
 To illustrate what this different mode of symbolization
 might be, Goodman makes constant use of a particular ex-
 ample; namely, the tailor's fabric sample. This sample re-
 fers explicitly to something that it in no way denotes. But to
 what does it refer? Clearly, to some of its own properties
 (color, texture, etc.) to the exclusion of others (dimension,
 shape, etc.). Thus he would say that the sample is denoted
 by predicates ("yellow," "silky," etc.) to which it refers ac-
 cording to the mode of exemplification. Therefore, in his
 more general (that is, not strictly linguistic) theory of sym-
 bolization, Goodman retains the term sample to designate
 that which exemplifies (thus possessing at least one prop-
 erty denoted by a predicate or label), and he adopts the
 term label to designate that which is exemplified (and
 which necessarily denotes one of the sample's properties). A
 label conceived in this manner is not necessarily verbal, but
 25
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 5. Ricardo Porro with A. de la
 Noue, Elsa Triolet College, St.
 Denis, France, 1989
 it has the same characteristics as a predicate. For instance,
 Goodman maintains that the gestures of an orchestra con-
 ductor are labels denoting the sounds that he expects, even
 if, occasionally, these gestures might exemplify some of
 their properties, such as a particular cadence of which, in
 that case, they are a sample.'2 In fact, if they generally only
 denote sounds, it is because they are not themselves such
 sounds, in contrast - to use his example - to the gestures
 of a physical training instructor, which are clearly samples
 of the movements the instructor wants to see executed. In
 brief, Goodman is stating that labels denote whereas
 samples illustrate. Note that these two terms are relatively
 appropriate for his general theory of symbolization, since
 "label" has the advantage of referring less directly to an en-
 tirely linguistic universe of discourse than "predicate," and
 since "sample" has the advantage of being both perfectly
 general and evocative of the illuminating example of the
 fabric sample. Having clarified the distinction between
 denotation and exemplification, we will explicate the
 meaning, according to Goodman, of other modes of sym-
 bolization through a discussion of their potential applica-
 tion to architecture.
 Exemplification, Expression, and Architecture
 To grasp the pertinence of this general theory of symboliza-
 tion to reflection on art, suffice it to say that it allows us to
 account, in an analytically coherent language, for various
 types of symbolism that might confer an aesthetic dimen-
 sion on works of art. And for self-evident reasons, such a
 complex theory of symbolization seems particularly wel-
 come when dealing with nonrepresentational arts like mu-
 sic or architecture, which can refer to the world through
 denotation (namely, through representation) only in very
 exceptional cases. In the short article that he dedicated to
 architecture, Goodman mentions some of these exceptions:
 26
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 Jorn Utzon's Sydney Opera House and Antonio Gaudi's
 Sagrada Familia, which might represent, respectively, a
 group of sailboats and the peaks of Montserrat." Other ar-
 chitectural masterpieces that Goodman does not mention
 are still less equivocal: for example, both the famous TWA
 Terminal Building by Eero Saarinen at Kennedy Airport in
 New York and the less widely known school by Ricardo
 Porro in Saint-Denis to the north of Paris explicitly repre-
 sent great birds, in the first instance, an eagle ready to take
 off and, in the second, a dove striving to impart peaceful
 sentiments to children in the playground. We might also
 think, as Goodman does, of a popular type of architecture
 that literally takes the shape, usually for advertising pur-
 poses, of animals or of edible goods, such as the pathetic
 duck in Riverside, Long Island, rendered famous by Ven-
 turi (who made it the magnified prototype of what he called
 "duck" buildings). But these are the rare exceptions.
 For this reason, an analysis that highlights exemplification
 as a quite different type of reference accounts much more
 effectively for the ways in which works of architecture sym-
 bolize things. In this context, Goodman gives some ex-
 amples that do not strike me as among the best available.
 According to him, the Schroeder House in Utrecht by
 Gerrit Rietveld exemplifies "certain characteristics of its
 structure," while the Church of Vierzehnheiligen in North-
 ern Bavaria exemplifies a structure derived from a cruci-
 form plan.14 The Rietveld house is surely an excellent
 example in some respects, although, at least where struc-
 tural characteristics are concerned, that it was, for eco-
 nomic reasons, constructed in stucco-covered bricks
 imitating concrete renders it a delicate one. As for the
 Vierzehnheiligen church, one of the most remarkable
 works of the German baroque, its cruciform plan is so al-
 tered by its interplay with circles and ellipses that the ex-
 ample seems to illustrate less a case of exemplification as
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 6. Richard Rogers, P.A.
 Technology Center, Highstown,
 New Jersey, 1982
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 7. Amiens Cathedral, France,
 thirteenth century, view of one








 8. GOnther Domenig, Central
 Savings Bank, Vienna, Austria,
 1975-79
 subtly give rise. Nonetheless, the cases of exemplification of
 more salient traits in great works of architecture remain
 multiple. Certainly, we might think of high-tech works that
 proudly display their structure, like Richard Rogers's
 Pompidou Centre in Paris (with Renzo Piano), his Lloyd's
 of London Building, or his P.A. Technology Center in
 Highstown, New Jersey. Or we might think of more
 "brutalist" works, including numerous stadiums and arenas
 with visible concrete ribs. All of these works exemplify their
 structural properties by rendering them obvious. But it
 would be enough to point out that most Gothic cathedrals
 spectacularly exemplify the manner in which the impres-
 sive weight of their vaults, arching toward heaven, is distrib-
 uted through a system of articulated buttresses along the
 paths designed for grounding it securely.
 And it is not only such structural features that can be thus
 exemplified. In architecture as in painting, a spot of color,
 whose effect has been carefully foreseen by the architect,
 allows for the exemplification of the qualities of this par-
 ticular color in a specific context; as is illustrated by the
 Schroeder House itself and more clearly by Aalto's Tuber-
 culosis Sanatorium in Paimio, the vibrant color of which,
 superimposed on a perfectly white surface, immediately
 captures the attention of any visitor. A whole range of
 building characteristics are exemplified in this manner.
 Solidity is eloquently exemplified by most of what H. H.
 Richardson built. Verticality is dramatically exemplified by
 countless Gothic cathedrals, such as Amiens or Cologne, as
 well as by innumerable modern skyscrapers.'5 Horizontality
 is clearly exemplified by Wright's "Prairie Style" houses as
 well as by Mies's Crown Hall at the Illinois Institute of
 Technology or his New National Gallery in Berlin. To
 complete this geometrical register, even obliqueness is ex-
 emplified, in a disconcerting manner, by the forty-five-
 degree-angle houses built by Piet Blom in the Netherlands,
 at Helmond and at Rotterdam.
 28
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 What is still more interesting in Goodman's analysis is that
 his general theory of reference makes room for another sym-
 bolization mode, expression, which, in his view, is simply the
 exemplification of a property possessed metaphorically rather
 than literally. It is in this metaphorical manner that so many
 Romanesque churches, as well as, in a somewhat unexpected
 fashion, certain company headquarters located in the coun-
 tryside, express tranquillity. Conversely, so many baroque
 churches express movement; as do, in more recent examples,
 Guinther Domenig's curious bank in Vienna, with its dy-
 namically undulating fagade, or Raili and Reima Pietila's
 library in Tampere, Finland - even if some of their very
 functions, prayer or reading, say, rather evoke calmness. Here
 again, Goodman has chosen different examples, but the im-
 portant point is that the expressed property is possessed in a
 uniquely metaphorical sense, since inanimate and stationary
 buildings can no more be calm than in movement.
 This definition of exemplification strictly based on the pos-
 session of a quality raises, however, an apparent theoretical
 problem, especially in the case of architecture, and this needs
 some clarification. Goodman assures us that a symbol only ex-
 emplifies or expresses properties that it has, whether literally
 as in exemplification or metaphorically as in expression.16
 But is this really tenable? In architecture, at least, it certainly
 seems that some buildings exemplify or express properties that
 they do not possess. A fairly typical case of exemplification
 may help us to see the problem: Many buildings built by Mies
 after his arrival in North America - especially since his
 groundbreaking Lake Shore Drive Apartments in Chicago -
 are characterized by I-beams that are literally applied outside
 of the walls, along the length of the supporting pillars down to
 the base of the lower-level windows. Although this architec-
 tural device is not justified structurally, we must nevertheless
 affirm that it strongly contributes to the vigorous manifesta-
 tion of the undeniable structural purity of these buildings.








 9. Ludwig Mies van der Rohe,
 Lake Shore Drive Apartments,
 Chicago, Illinois, 1949-51, view
 of corner I-beam.
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 10. Bramante, Santa Maria
 presso San Satiro, Milan, Italy,
 1482-86, view of trompe-l'oeil
 choir.
 clearly exemplify these properties. Here, this trick merely
 adds to the exemplification of a property actually possessed by
 the building. Yet, since it is a trick, it might equally have ex-
 pressed a property not possessed by the building. This is illus-
 trated by the many instances of trompe-l'oeil that we find in
 architecture." It is well known that the architects of ancient
 Greece developed the art of arranging temple columns so
 that, through systematic modifications that compensated for
 various optical deformations, they created the illusion of a
 mathematical regularity that, given this very intervention, was
 clearly not present.1" During the high Renaissance, when
 trompe-l'oeil was still exceptional, Bramante, lacking room to
 provide a regular choir to the church Santa Maria presso San
 Satiro in Milan, did not hesitate to use painting to create a
 perspectival illusion to suggest that the church was a good ex-
 ample of a cruciform structure.19 But by contrast with most
 churches, Bramante's church does not possess this quality
 since its plan is T-shaped. During the baroque period, of
 course, such techniques became the rule; yet let us consider
 another example from a country that has tended to be espe-
 cially resistant to the baroque and to trompe-l'oeil. The H6tel
 de Matignon, presently the official residence of the French
 prime minister, had to be built on a site that prevented its
 faGades - overlooking, respectively, courtyard and garden -
 from both being symmetrically designed in relation to a
 single central axis. Since a well-balanced axis was associated
 with the image of nobility, Jean Courtonne accentuated the
 symmetry of each of the faGades so as to suggest the existence
 of such an ideal axiality of the whole building. Although the
 H6tel de Matignon does not possess this property, its clever
 architect gave the impression that its faGades, uncentered as
 they may be one in relation with the other, "exemplify" most
 eloquently the axiality of this type of building.2"
 It is important to recognize that the above-cited examples of
 trompe-l'oeil are, in no sense, cases of metaphorical posses-
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 sion of a property. To help us understand what he means by
 this, Goodman explains that an object possesses a property
 metaphorically when this property can only be attributed
 to it by virtue of a type of intentional "category mistake"
 through which we attempt to expand the power of words.2"
 His favorite illustration of such a thing is the painting that is
 said to express a certain sense of sadness. If this painting ex-
 presses sadness, it is because, in a sense, we can say that this
 very painting is sad and thus possesses the property of sad-
 ness. But the painting can only possess this property meta-
 phorically, since, being incapable of feelings, it cannot
 literally be called "sad" without our committing a category
 mistake. We are clearly faced with a type of category mistake
 when stating that a church is calm or that a bank is nervous,
 but it is hard to say how this would be the case when stating
 that the H6tel de Matignon is perfectly axially organized in
 its plans and in its construction. This last judgment would
 not be a category mistake, it would simply be a falsity. It
 sounds quite reasonable indeed to say metaphorically,
 Domenig's bank is as nervous as a building can be, but it
 would be absurd to say that the H6tel de Matignon is as
 axial as a building can be. If its architect nonetheless man-
 aged to make the Hotel de Matignon express a kind of axial
 quality, it cannot be according to Goodman's sense of "ex-
 pression," because the property expressed here is possessed
 neither literally nor metaphorically.
 Here again my goal is less to challenge Goodman's analysis
 than to adapt it to the peculiarities of architecture. As he is
 primarily concerned with highlighting the complexity of
 symbolization, nothing prevents us from imagining that, be-
 sides denotation and exemplification, there are other ways
 to symbolize that he does not explicitly characterize in his
 discussion of aesthetic experience. In any case, Goodman
 clearly allows for such a possibility since he does not limit
 the modes of symbolization to those he applies to art. In-
 deed, he refers to multiple "routes of reference" and espe-
 cially to complex modes of symbolization that are reducible
 to simple ones through more or less complex chains of ref-
 erence.22 In this context, to cover the trompe-l'oeil cases that
 are so important in architecture, it might be useful to define
 explicitly such a complex mode of symbolization - one
 that I propose to call suggestion. Let us say that an object
 can symbolically suggest a property that it does not really
 possess, if it possesses some other feature through which it
 represents (or denotes in some other way) a third object that
 itself possesses and exemplifies the suggested property. For
 example, San Satiro symbolically suggests the property of
 being cruciform, which it does not really possess, because it
 possesses the property of being painted in some illusionistic
 way through which it represents a typical cruciform church
 that itself possesses and exemplifies the property of being
 cruciform. But can we say that San Satiro represents a cruci-
 form church? Certainly, the painting on its front wall repre-
 sents an apsidal choir, but can we say that the whole church
 represents a cruciform church? If we do, should we not say
 as well that any cruciform church represents any other one?
 The only way to save the idea that San Satiro, but not any
 cruciform church, represents a church that exemplifies
 cruciformity is by insisting that through its front painting,
 San Satiro manifests the intention to represent a cruciform
 church; whereas in other churches there is no intention to
 represent anything else. But this would introduce intention-
 ality into the very notion of representation. If such is the
 case, this attempt to reduce "suggestion" to a composite
 mode of symbolization (to the representation of a sample)
 would reveal that there is no real symbolization without an
 intent to symbolize. After all, any clothespin does not repre-
 sent any other one, but Claes Oldenberg's giant Clothespin
 in Philadelphia represents a clothespin because, as a work
 of art, it manifests an intention to do so. Be that as it may,
 the merit of Goodman's conceptual apparatus is less to re-
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 veal this trait of symbolization than to characterize and to
 distinguish with some precision the various ways through
 which a work of art symbolizes.
 For example, it is interesting to distinguish exemplification
 from what I have just called "suggestion," even if sugges-
 tion, like exemplification and expression - and in contrast
 to denotation, which takes the opposite route - goes from
 the object of art toward the symbolized property. Indeed,
 exemplification is usefully characterized as an inversion of
 the referential movement of a denotation and there can be
 no denoting of a property without its being possessed by
 that which is denoted. Now, in the case of trompe-l'oeil,
 there can be no question of the inversion of the referential
 movement of any denotation. The predicate axial, indeed,
 does not denote the H6tel de Matignon, since the Hotel de
 Matignon does not possess axiality, neither literally nor
 metaphorically. Yet this building is no less eloquently sug-
 gestive of an axial organization than the Lake Shore Drive
 Apartments are suggestive of structural purity. If the present
 analysis is well founded, we have to conclude that the ways
 of symbolizing at work in aesthetic experience are relatively
 complex and that this increases the usefulness of Good-
 man's groundbreaking attempt to use analytical means to
 describe the richness of the symbolic world.
 Naturally, we can object that most of such aesthetic sym-
 bolization can also be described with more natural lan-
 guage. Aesthetic experiences derived from trompe-l'oeil,
 like the experience provided by San Satiro, can be quite
 satisfactorily described by phenomenological or psycho-
 logical means. But the point of a systematic approach like
 Goodman's is not to reveal for each of these modes of sym-
 bolization dimensions that cannot otherwise be perceived.
 Rather, if Goodman's analysis is worth revisiting, it is be-
 cause it offers a conceptual apparatus that permits us to
 compare symbolization as it works in various arts and even
 to relate aesthetic symbolization with other forms of refer-
 ence occurring in other fields of experience.
 When is Architecture?
 It is true that Goodman, somewhat ambitiously, expects still
 more from his analysis. According to him, such a theory of
 symbolizing could considerably help to solve one of the most
 fundamental problems of aesthetics; namely, knowing what
 characterizes a work of art. While this question - which
 Goodman has aptly reformulated as, when is art? _2- is hard
 to solve for any art, it seems even less answerable when con-
 sidering functional arts like architecture. We cannot answer
 it simply by saying that architecture is identified with what
 professional architects build. Indeed, it may be possible for a
 respected architect to build functional buildings without aim-
 ing to "do architecture," whereas it is much more difficult to
 imagine that a professional painter could spend a lifetime
 applying color to a canvas without aiming to do painting. In
 such a context, it is difficult to determine which buildings ex-
 ecuted by entrepreneurs and engineers from architects' plans
 are to be counted as works of architecture (or as works of art)
 and which should be considered as mere functional build-
 ings without artistic pretensions. The answer that Goodman's
 analysis claims to vindicate relies on symbolism as the crite-
 rion of judgment: "a building is a work of art only insofar as it
 signifies, means, refers, symbolizes in some way."'4
 At first glance, it seems indeed that the conceptual precision
 and coherence of Goodman's theoretical framework, which,
 in many regards, differentiates it from more literary ap-
 proaches to symbolism, might constitute a helpful tool in dis-
 tinguishing a true work of art from a purely functional object.
 As promising as it may look, this approach will not do, none-
 theless, without allowing for at least two problematic ambigu-
 ities, the first related to the asymmetrical structure of the
 various modes of symbolization and the second to the con-
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 nection between art and symbolism. In observing that very
 few buildings represent something, as we have seen,
 Goodman concludes that architecturally significant build-
 ings symbolize (or mean) through other modes, essentially
 derived from exemplification. But we have also seen that
 exemplification is based on an asymmetrical relationship
 and that it is not necessarily the case that everything de-
 noted exemplifies that which denotes it. Goodman, how-
 ever, sometimes seems to hesitate on this point. He states,
 for example, that monosyllabic words like short and long are
 denoted by the word short and that they are samples of this
 word that they exemplify.25 Yet to affirm this, we must take
 for granted that the second condition required for exempli-
 fication - namely, reference to a given property - is
 present here. But, in what sense might we claim that the
 short length of the words short and long actually refers to
 what is meant by the word short? Could these short words
 be considered so clearly symbols of shortness that we could
 correctly say that they exemplify this property? By consider-
 ing that their very shortness is sufficient to qualify such
 words as samples of shortness, Goodman seems to suggest
 that possessing a quality (being denoted) is sufficient for ex-
 emplifying (being a sample).26 It is not in such a loose way
 that he uses the fabric sample to refer explicitly to the color
 yellow. It is a more restrained sense of the word exemplifica-
 tion that is illustrated by this example and it is only in this
 more restrained sense that exemplification is a fruitful con-
 cept for analyzing the type of symbolizing that characterizes
 art and architecture.27
 So, to exemplify, that which is denoted must also refer to
 that which denotes it, and refer to it in a particular mode
 defined as "exemplification." Yet the criterion that would
 allow us to recognize the presence of this particular mode
 is by no means clear. Not being in a position to provide us
 with such a criterion, Goodman instead offers the illumi-
 nating example of the fabric sample; but, unfortunately,
 this example cannot be considered representative of what is
 going on in art. Indeed, as Goodman has clearly shown, the
 sample exemplifies its color and texture, properties that it
 does possess, rather than other properties, like its shape and
 size, that it equally possesses, because it shares the first prop-
 erties and not the second with the garment that the tailor
 wishes to make. Thus the relationship between a sample and
 a label ("yellow" or "silky") is determined, in a sense, with
 the help of a third term; namely, the garment. Now, in repre-
 sentational art, it is also the case that the work of art exem-
 plifies a property that belongs to a third term; namely, the
 depicted object. But in nonrepresentational art, and espe-
 cially in architecture, which is so rarely representational, this
 is not typically the case. And remember it is precisely in deal-
 ing with nonrepresentational art that exemplification and ex-
 pression take such a central place in Goodman's analysis of
 art and architecture. Amiens Cathedral exemplifies its verti-
 cality, a property that it undoubtedly possesses given that its
 columns soar in a single jet to the summit of the nave. But if
 this cathedral exemplifies these properties rather than others
 such as heaviness, which it equally possesses, it is not by
 virtue of the fact that it shares the first property but not the
 second with something else. The cathedral is a sample of
 verticality, but if it is not, for example, a sample of heaviness
 in the same way, this is because it does not symbolize heavi-
 ness in the same way as verticality, as can only be indicated
 by an aesthetic sense or by a symbolic view of the world,
 which cannot be clarified by Goodman's analysis of exempli-
 fication. Here again, it seems that there is exemplification
 when an intention to exemplify is involved, but this can
 hardly provide an easily applicable criterion.2 In such a con-
 text, to answer the crucial question of when is art? we must
 first answer the question of when actually is exemplification?
 And to such a question, the answer remains largely open.
 A similar problem arises when we consider expression instead
 of literal exemplification. It is true that we do not face, as
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 such, the problem raised by asymmetry. Indeed, even if an
 object does not necessarily exemplify any property it really
 possesses, such an object seems necessarily to express any
 property it metaphorically possesses. If we say metaphori-
 cally that movement is everywhere in a baroque church, it
 is because it expresses movement. The problem of finding
 what characterizes a work of art is not necessarily made
 easier, however. In this context, indeed, to answer
 the question, when is art? requires that we first answer the
 question, when is a property metaphorically possessed and
 actually expressed? And to such a question also the answer
 remains largely open.
 The second ambiguity that poses a problem for Goodman's
 solution to this fundamental problem of aesthetics stems
 from the condition that things that clearly exemplify or ex-
 press some property do not necessarily exemplify or express
 in an aesthetic manner. As Goodman himself states, "Of
 course, not all symbolic functioning is aesthetic."29 Ameri-
 can theme parks, for example, are full of "kitsch" buildings
 that are highly symbolic in Goodman's sense - they rep-
 resent, exemplify, or express many things - but that are
 characterized as kitsch precisely by those who want to deny
 their truly aesthetic character or to deny that they can
 count as real "architecture." Incidentally, we find ourselves
 confronted with this particular ambiguity when, in order to
 overcome the ambiguity that surrounds the concept of ex-
 emplification, we look for an example in architecture that
 might exemplify as unequivocally as Goodman's fabric
 sample. The building world seems to provide such an ex-
 ample in the model house in an entrepreneurial housing
 development. Such a model serves exactly the same role as
 the sample: it exemplifies some of companion houses' prop-
 erties (general plan, dimensions, quality of materials, etc.)
 to the exclusion of others (site, orientation, colors, etc.).
 Yet, even if the model house exemplifies as unequivocally
 as the fabric sample, it clearly does not exemplify in an
 aesthetic manner and therefore does not constitute an
 example of a work of "architecture."
 In the end, Goodman's criterion of symbolization does not
 really permit us to solve the formidable problem of the
 specificity of a work of art or work of architecture. So what
 is its use? When applied to architecture, Goodman's analy-
 sis provides a set of technical concepts that allows us to
 clarify the issue and to construct a framework for further
 discussion. Even if further attempts to answer the question
 of when is architecture? turn out to be a dead end, we have
 seen that Goodman's theory of symbolization and his dis-
 tinction between autographic and allographic art can help
 to characterize, respectively, the specificity of the symbol-
 ization involved in architecture and the specific dimen-
 sions of the identity of an architectural work. While such
 conceptual clarifications tend to open a program of re-
 search rather than to provide a set of definitive statements,
 they represent, in some sense, one of the most fascinating
 contributions of philosophical analysis - and especially of
 analytic philosophy - to the theory of architecture.
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